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Abstract
Icelandic fish stocks underwent privatisation in 1990, when existing fishing quotas were made fully transferable. The country’s
system of individual transferable quotas has since been held up as a paragon of virtue for sustainable fisheries. This might be valid
for ecological and most economic concerns, but for a truly sustainable fisheries management system the question of social
impacts has to be addressed as well. This paper evaluates the performance of Icelandic fisheries management from a spatial
and social point of view. The theoretical framing stems from the concepts of resilience and vulnerability. Through cluster and
correlation analyses, different development trajectories of Icelandic fishing communities since 1990 are revealed. The results are
presented on maps. Even though it is no longer the country’s largest economic sector, the livelihood of many small and remote
settlements is strongly connected to the fisheries. Consolidation has taken place in the fisheries and rural-to-urban migration has
continued. The majority of coastal communities can be classified as vulnerable, regarding the status of the local fishing industry
in 2014. Regarding demographic development, the number of vulnerable communities was significantly higher in 2014 than it
was at the early 1990s.
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Introduction
Natural resource management is a complex endeavour, as it
involves stakeholder groups with opposing interests. Fisheries
management is no exception. In Iceland, the quasi-
privatisation of fishing rights through individual transferable
quotas (ITQs), that was completed in the early 1990s, did not
go uncontested. It left deep social, economic and political rifts
(Eythórsson 2003). Antagonistic perceptions can be detected
not only among academics who have analysed this, but also
within the fisheries sector, where small-scale fishermen de-
mand access to the same resource as large-scale, vertically
integrated, companies (Chambers and Carothers 2017,
Mariat-Roy 2014). Although the state of the marine resources
was the major justification for introducing ITQs (Matthiasson
2003), economic goals were no less central, driven by over-
arching objectives of efficiency and centralisation (Árnason
1998, 2012, Eythórsson 2000). Those are substantial argu-
ments, and arguably the system in use before was unsustain-
able in every aspect (Haraldsson and Carey 2011). But thorny
socio-political issues remain unresolved. According to the first
article of the Fisheries Management Act, “the exploitable ma-
rine stocks of the Icelandic fishing banks are the common
property of the Icelandic nation. The objective of this Act is
to promote their conservation and efficient utilisation, thereby
ensuring stable employment and settlement throughout
Iceland” “(Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture
2006; italization by authors)”.
The experience of Iceland with ITQs has been repeatedly
presented as an economic success story (Árnason 2008,
Danielsson 1997, Hannesson 2003). Economic concerns,
however, are just one aspect of fisheries management. At least
two academic strands other than economics demand consid-
eration, namely ecology and social sciences. The input of
ecology is manifested in this case through the setting of an
annual total allowable catch (TAC), scientific advice andmon-
itoring. Icelandic fisheries perform comparatively well also in
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this regard, and have indeed recovered from severely depleted
fish stocks in the 1970s (Haraldsson and Carey 2011,
Eythórsson 2000). The third dimension however, that of the
social sciences (other than economics), has been rather weakly
addressed. Social scientists have struggled to make their
voices heard (for an overview of the state of social sciences
in Icelandic fisheries see: Chambers and Kokorsch 2017).
Premonitions and critiques regarding negative effects of
ITQs for fishing communities have been frequent, accompa-
nied by questions of equity and social responsibility
(Karlsdóttir 2008, Pálsson and Helgason 1995, 1996,
Eythórsson 1996, 2000, 2003, Holm et al. 2015). Since the
“direct subject of fisheries management is not fish, but people
who are embedded in existing social, political and economic
institutions” (Campling et al., 2012, 181), a more thorough
investigation of the human perspective in fisheries manage-
ment is necessary.
Several coastal communities in Iceland have found them-
selves in demographic and socio-economic difficulties, which
is a blot on a supposedly sustainable management scheme:
“Sustainable development is a three legged stool embodying
environmental, economic and social sustainability; dangers
arise when one of these legs is weakened by neglect”
(Symes and Phillipson 2009, 1). But to what extent can the
fisheries sector in general, and transferable quotas in particu-
lar, be held responsible for local development trajectories?
Almost three decades after the implementation of ITQs, a
comprehensive analysis appears well overdue: how have
Icelandic fishing communities fared during the time since
the regime was introduced? Or more specifically: is there a
connection between the development of the fisheries sector
and socio-economic and demographic developments at the
local level? This, in a nutshell, is the focus of this article.
In dynamic and complex socio-ecological systems, such as
fisheries, usually more than just one decisive causal variable
can be detected (Folke 2006, Johnsen 2017, Ostrom 2009).
The questions above can therefore only be partially answered
here. In vulnerable systems, however, “even small distur-
bances may cause dramatic social consequences” (Folke
2006, 253). Thus the assumption that the ongoing process of
centralisation in the fisheries sector has had tremendous im-
pacts on the local level might be warranted (Agnarsson et al.,
2016, Eythórsson 2000). In the paper, socio-economic, demo-
graphic and fisheries data from three different points in time
will be evaluated through cluster analysis. In a second step,
correlation analysis is used to reveal possible connections be-
tween fisheries, demographic development and the socio-
economic performance at the local community scale. This
analysis provides a retrospective evaluation of the social and
regional impacts that have evolved after the policy change.
The results are important for two main reasons. First, they
provide an empirically backed-up warning about negative so-
cial impacts of ITQs, which should be of value for international
and domestic policy makers. Second, the results shed light on
the heated debate about to what extent transferable quotas have
resulted in a truly sustainable fisheries management system.
Resilience and vulnerability
The theoretical framework for this study stems from the con-
cept of resilience, which has become pervasive in natural re-
sourcemanagement and social sciences during the past decade
(Clay and Olson 2008, Lorenz 2013, Nelson et al., 2007,
Benson and Garmestani 2011, Welsh 2014). This includes
also discussions on appropriate fisheries management (Olson
2011, White 2015, Symes et al., 2015, Pauwelussen 2016).
In a general sense, resilience centres on potential responses
to a sudden shock or disturbance, in terms of renewal, regen-
eration, or reorganisation (Folke 2006). This includes the ca-
pacity, potential and ability of ecological, social and/or eco-
nomic systems to adapt and manage changes in both reactive
and proactive ways. Social resilience is defined as “the ability
of groups or communities to cope with external stresses and
disturbances as a result of social, political and environmental
change” (Speranza et al., 2014, 110).
Vulnerability is often understood as the opposite of resilience
(Obrist et al., 2010, Scoones 1998, Turner 2014, Adger 2000).
For Adger (2006, 269), vulnerability determines the “degree to
which a system is susceptible to and is unable to cope with
adverse effects”. Blount et al. (2015, 2) define vulnerability as
“the lack of an ability to withstand destabilizing changes”.
Building on this, the key parameters of vulnerability are the
stress to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adap-
tive capacity (Carpenter and Brock 2008, Folke et al. 2002). In
addition, ‘buffer capacity’marks the thin line between a resilient
and a vulnerable system. It can be defined as the “amount of
change (disturbance) a system can undergo (absorb) and still
retain the same structure, function, identity and feedbacks on
function and structure” (Speranza et al., 2014, 112). Buffer ca-
pacity is directly influenced by endowments and entitlements.
Endowments determine the resources owned by an actor, while
entitlements refer to an actor’s access to resources (Speranza
et al., 2014, Ozkan and Schott 2013). Hence, buffer capacity,
endowments and entitlements are important aspects for local
resilience, particularly for communities with limited economic
resources that are dependent on individual decisions regarding
the trading of such entitlements (Dale and Newman 2006).
Endowments and entitlements are subject to the underlying
management regime and changes can have profound effects at
the local scale. The loss of entitlements to a resource, for
example through privatisation and changing ownership struc-
tures, affects the socio-economic capacity and control over
local resources (Ozkan and Schott 2013). The result of such
changes can be disenfranchised communities with limited ca-
pabilities for continued existence.
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Icelandic fisheries management and fishing
communities
A brief outline of major events and general periods of growth,
stagnation and decline in the national fisheries since 1900
(Fig. 1) is appropriate for recapitulating the turbulent history
and to understand the reasons that eventually led to the intro-
duction of an ITQ system.
Fisheries were a key industry in Iceland throughout the
twentieth century and they still have a central role, even
though tourism and heavy industries now compete for the
leading position in the country’s economy (Jóhannesson
2016). Several communities owe their emergence to their
proximity to rich fishing grounds and some towns were not
even ‘on the map’ before fisheries became economically sig-
nificant in the early twentieth century. Fisheries were an at-
tractive pull-factor and people relocated from scattered farm-
steads and temporary settlements to the shore (Valsson et al.,
2013). Another economic boom came with the herring fisher-
ies. The era from 1930 to 1968 is presented in the nation’s
history books as the ‘herring adventure’ (Icel. síldarævintýrið)
(Hamilton et al. 2004). The ups and downs – not only for the
national economy, but also many settlements in Northern
Iceland –were bound to this species. Overfishing put a sudden
end to this adventure.
Diversification of target species and improvements of the
fishing fleet led to a rapid recovery and ‘one-company-vil-
lages’ were still common (Eythórsson 1996, Matthiasson
2003, cf. Halseth and Sullivan 2004). Reliance on one eco-
nomic sector left most communities vulnerable to structural
and technological changes that set in after the 1970s.
History repeats itself. Overfishing became a serious threat
again in the 1980s. The central government had to intervene
and initiated quota management for all species in 1984. Then,
in 1990, the quotas were made fully transferable. While ITQs
have contributed to increased economic efficiency and
centralisation, quota sales have left numerous coastal commu-
nities in trouble (Gunnlaugsson and Saevaldsson 2016).
Unsurprisingly, critiques of ITQ management have centred
on social/regional aspects (see below) and questions of justice
and equity (Soliman 2014, Holm et al. 2015, McCay 1995,
Olson 2011, Benediktsson and Karlsdóttir 2011). Previously
locally-embedded companies changed ownership and the fish-
eries gradually became a ‘footloose industry’, where location
did not matter much anymore (Eythórsson 2000). The enclo-
sure of the sea and new ownership structures invited compar-
isons to feudalism (Pálsson 1998). Research has revealed gen-
eral discontent among stakeholder groups regarding social
responsibility and regional development (Kokorsch et al.,
2015, Chambers and Carothers 2017). The effects of quota
sales at the local scale have been researched by several authors
(Chambers 2016, Kokorsch 2017). Even though connections
between fisheries, socio-economic and demographic perfor-
mance have been traced for several communities, no universal
conclusion has been possible yet.
That negative local and regional consequences are
recognised by policy makers can be seen in the few amend-
ments that have been made to the Fisheries Management Act.
Community quotas and a coastal fisheries scheme have been
introduced (see Fig. 1) (for an overview over the schemes see:
Chambers and Carothers 2017, Þórðarson and Viðarsson
2014). Community quotas are of particular interest here.
According to article 10 in the Icelandic Fisheries
Management Act, up to 12,000 t (ungutted weight) of demersal
fish can be allocated to communities that are facing difficulties
due to downturns in fisheries and which are dependent upon
demersal fishing or processing [and/or] to communities which
have suffered unexpected cutbacks in the total catch quotas of
fishing vessels operating from and landing their catch in the
communities in question, which has had a substantial impact on
Fig. 1 Major events and general
periods of growth, stagnation and
decline in the Icelandic fisheries
since 1900
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the employment situation in these communities (Icelandic
Ministry of Fisheries and Agriculture 2006).
The success of these instruments can be debated
(Chambers 2016, Kokorsch 2017). Employment in fisheries,
including jobs in both the primary and secondary sectors (fish-
ing and fish processing), has been declining despite those
modifications. Since 1990 some 5100 jobs (or 36%) were lost
from the sectors (Statistics Iceland 2015a, b). The numbers are
more drastic for rural Iceland (38%) than for the capital region
(27%). Jobs in processing have been decreasing faster than
those in the harvesting sector (41% versus 29% decrease).
Methodology
Defining fishing communities
Defining a ‘fishing village’ or ‘fishing community’ is a diffi-
cult task (for an extensive discussion on this terminology see
Clay and Olson 2008). It is defined here simply as a spatial
unit demarcated by geographical and/or administrative bound-
aries, where fishing and/or fish processing takes place. Four
steps were used to identify fishing communities, building on
comparable studies in the US fisheries (Jacob and Jepson
2000, Colburn and Jepson 2012, Jepson and Colburn 2013).
The data were provided by the Directorate of Fisheries and
Statistics Iceland and the key variables used were harbour,
quota, fishing activity and fisheries dependency.
Places with a designated harbour were selected in the first
round. In a second step, it was examined whether or not
quotas were allocated to boats registered at those harbours.
Even though quotas are allotted to boat owners and not the
harbour itself, this is a first indication. Quotas, due to their
transferability, can be classified as a ‘footloose’ commodity.
Accordingly, the absence of quotas does not necessarily result
in the absence of fishing activities. Fishing activity indicates
the presence of harvesting, processing and fisheries-related
industries. In case of little activity, or low fisheries dependen-
cy, the harbour and its attached community were not consid-
ered for further examination. The procedure to define
dependency follows the analytical framework provided by
Colburn and Jepson (2012), who measured landing per capita.
According to these criteria, 57 communities were identified
for the fishing year 1991/92 (see Fig. 2). These were analysed
further. The number decreased to 53 in 2002 and 51 in 2014.
Data collection
As the spatial, temporal and economic dimensions cannot be
assessed in isolation in a resilience framework, all three di-
mensions are considered (Adger 2000, Clay and Olson 2008,
Obrist et al., 2010, Turner et al. 2003). Regarding data com-
pilation, several aspects need to be considered: neither should
the number of variables be too high, as this might lead to
confusion, nor should the assumption of mono-causality be
suggested by choosing too few variables (Holling 2001).
Furthermore, the analysis follows the rationale to reduce com-
plex data into a workable amount of information and proxy
measures (Nymand Larsen et al., 2010).
Several theoretical and methodological discussions for the
comprehensive assessment of ecological, economic and social
goals at the local scale are at hand (Cox and Hamlen 2015,
Reed et al., 2006). Regarding the choice of variables for the
community level, Cutter et al. (2008) recommend six dimen-
sions, of which three are included in this Iceland-specific anal-
ysis (ecological, economic and social), while the other three
(institutional, infrastructure and community competence) are
not quantifiable at the local scale in Iceland with official data.
Lee (2014) suggest ‘integrated factors of social vulnerability’
of which the demographic and socio-economic characteristics
find entrance here. These authors discuss how to interpret the
either positive or negative effects of each variable on the
resilience-building process. In addition, the ‘Arctic Social
Indicators’ serve as a reference for assessing different devel-
opment paths in places located in the arctic region (Nymand
Larsen et al., 2010).
Regarding fishing communities in particular, comparable
studies on fisheries dependency and the political framing as
well as the interplay of natural and human factors (Nayak
et al., 2014, Morzaria-Luna et al., 2014) were considered in
the data compilation. Most important were the ‘Fishery
Performance Indicator’, developed by Anderson et al. (2014)
and the ‘social indicators’ for an analysis of resilience and vul-
nerability in fishing communities of the USA (Colburn and
Jepson 2012, Jepson and Colburn 2013, Blount et al. 2015).
The fishing year 1991/92 serves as the starting point or
reference year. This was the first year after the fishing quotas
had been made been fully transferable and also the first for
which an extensive amount of digital data is available. The
fishing year 2001/02 was chosen as a milestone for the anal-
ysis due to two aspects. Before community quotas were intro-
duced in 2003, no major changes had been made to the
Fisheries Management Act. Thus 2002 is the last year of a
more or less unaltered regulatory system. Besides, the first
decade of ITQs has been labelled as a ‘consolidation phase’
and it is appropriate to analyse the consolidation effects at the
local level (Eythórsson 2000, Gunnlaugsson and Saevaldsson
2016). That the fishing year 2013/14 serves as endpoint and
not a more recent one has two main reasons: the compilation
of the data set and its analysis tookmore time than anticipated,
and some data were not available until 2016.
The variables that were eventually chosen for the data set
are listed below (Table 1). Several other variables were con-
sidered, but the data were not accessible (see below). The
number of variables has increased over the years due to two
reasons. First, not only were numbers of the chosen years
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processed, but also changes between years were calculated.
This makes the data more robust, as it is less likely that
chance, for example unusually good or bad fishing years, in-
fluences the results. Second, the amount of available data has
increased since 1992.
Conducting quantitative research at the local scale over a
time-span of 25 years is not an uncomplicated endeavour in
Iceland. In particular, municipality amalgamations have made
it difficult to assemble a coherent database of socio-economic
variables. Most variables were calculated per capita. Due to a
range from around 24 inhabitants in the smallest community
to well over 120,000 in the largest one, outliers were to be
expected. Since the capital, Reykjavík, is by far the largest
community and thus in a class of its own, it was considered
to not include it in the analysis. One could also argue of course
that Reykjavík does not represent a typical fishing community,
especially in terms of employment and dependency. However,
it matches the set criteria explained above and leaving the
locality, which ranks amongst the highest in terms of absolute
quota allocations, processing and landings, out of such an
analysis seemed odd.
While numbers for fisheries-related employment in the pri-
mary and secondary sector were available at the local level,
figures for the tertiary sector were not. Apart from this, figures
regarding the economic performance of the fishing industry,
revenues and tax payments of fishing companies, were not
made accessible by the relevant institutions. Following the
examples from the aforementioned studies, data on the educa-
tional level in the communities were requested from the re-
sponsible institution. Considering the small size of some vil-
lages this was not possible, however, due to privacy
considerations. The tracing of return migrants to the commu-
nities was not possible either.
Cluster and correlation analyses
Different tools for processing and evaluating the collected data
were considered. Factor analysis and cluster analysis are ar-
guably the most suitable choices for an assessment of the sort
that that this study aimed for (Finch 2005, Murtagh and
Contreras 2012). Cluster analysis has been applied recently
in comparable research in the US (Pollnac et al. 2015) and
was eventually chosen for a number of reasons: the number of
communities under study is very small (n = 57) and especially
in comparison to the large number of variables, factor analysis
was not feasible. In addition, cluster analysis is more reliable
regarding the identification of patterns of similarity or dissim-
ilarity (Powell and Barrientos 2004, Pollnac et al. 2015).
Another reason is the aim of finding mutually exclusive
groups in a way which maximised differences between groups
that were themselves as homogenous as possible (Fonseca
2013). Besides, cluster analysis offers different subcategories
to tailor it to a specific case. The method used here is hierar-
chical agglomerative clustering and centroid measurement
(Karypis et al., 1999, Bouguettaya et al. 2015). Some alterna-
tives, such as the Ward method, were also tested. All methods
came up with similar results, but the centroid method is in
general less sensitive to outliers (Berkhin 2006).
The collected data were assigned to one of the three main
dimensions – fisheries, socio-economics or demographics.
After that, cluster analysis was conducted twice: First, an anal-
ysis of each of the single variables was run, to allow for a
Fig. 2 Fishing communities in
Iceland in the fishing year
1991/92
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Table 1 Variables included in the
analysis Variable Unit/ explanation Sources
c
Demographic dimension
Average age SI
- young population share of population aged 0–15 oc
- pensioners share of population older than 65 oc
Gender Percentage of male/female population SI
- Gender migrationPopulation Outmigration of male/female
Total population
oc
SI
- Population developmenta Relative population development oc
Socio-economic dimension
Debts Debts per capita SI
Innovationa New registered companies per capita SI
Long-term unemployment Unemployment rate over six month DL
Municipality tax Municipality tax per capita DIR
Net income Net income per capita DIR
Property tax Property tax per capita DIR
Property valueb Index for property value RI, pc
Salaries Salaries per capita DIR
Short-term unemploymenta Unemployment rate under six month DL
Social payments Social benefits paid per capita DIR
Unemployment Unemployment rate DL, pc
Unemployed fish workera Share of unemployed fish worker DL
Fisheries dimension
Allocated Quota Quotas per capita DF
Community Quotasb Community quotas per capita DF
Fleet Number of boats registered DF, SI
Fleet diversity Composition of fleet oc
Homeport landings Ratio of fish landed by local/outside fleet oc
Landings Landed fish per capita DF, SI
Landed Value Value of landed fish per capita DF, SI
Landed processed Value of fish landed processed per capita DF, SI
Landed for processing Value of fish for local processing per capita DF, SI
Large vessel share Share of large vessels (over 100GT) DF, SI
Licensed companies Companies with processing license IFVA, IRDI, pc
Processing Processed fish per capita DF, SI
Processed Value Value of processed fish per capita DF, SI
Quota/ boat size Division of quota between boat sizes DF, SI
Small scale ratio Share of small scale fisheries DF, SI
Share CFE Share per capita based on Cod Fish Equivalent DF
Total Catch Total catch per capita DF, SI
Additional data
Distance to capital Distance by road kilometres to Reykjavík IRCA
Community size Absolute population SI
Trawler Trawler part of community DF, SI
a Data for 2002 and 2014
bData only for 2014
cAbbreviations of sources: SI Statistics Iceland, DL Directorate of Labour, DIR Directorate of Internal Revenue,
RI Registers Iceland, DF Directorate of Fisheries, IFVA Icelandic Food and Veterinary Authority, oc own calcu-
lation, pc personal communication/requested data, IRDI Icelandic Regional Development Institute, IRCA
Icelandic Road and Coastal Administration
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subsequent analysis of individual variables, and then for each
of the three dimensions. The number of clusters was set to five
for all years, in order to facilitate the temporal analysis. In a
given year, every community was identified as belonging to
one of these five clusters, which spanned the range from ‘very
vulnerable’ to ‘very stable’. Different trajectories of commu-
nities through time could thus be identified.
This was followed by an analysis of correlation between
the three main dimensions, using the Pearson correlation co-
efficient. In addition, the associations of single variables with
each other were tested. The rationale for this is that even
though correlations between three main dimensions might
not be detected, it is still possible that single variables show
correlations.
Results
Cluster analysis
As stated before, 57 places matched the ‘fishing community’
definition in 1992. That fewer communities are identified in
later years is a first result and indication of the development in
itself. Considering the ongoing centralisation and closure of
processing sites, it does not come as a surprise. Communities
which had to be taken out were within the vulnerable fisheries
cluster in 1992.
Figure 3 visualises the number of communities in the vul-
nerable (red) and stable (green) clusters, as well as the move-
ment of fishing communities between the clusters from the
beginning to the end of the study period. For an easier com-
parison, the two vulnerable clusters and the two stable clusters
have been combined, whereas the ‘in-between’ category is
omitted in the figure. Regarding fisheries, the number of com-
munities in the vulnerable cluster is much higher than that in
the stable one. Out of 31 fishing communities that were vul-
nerable in 1992, only three can be classified as stable in 2014.
Another six – indicated by the dashed arrow in Fig. 3 – had
moved in an opposite direction and did not even match the
criteria of a fishing village after 1992. Some 58% remained
vulnerable. In addition, the economic and ecological condi-
tions need to be considered: while the TAC in 2013/14 was
much lower than it had been in the fishing years 1991/1992
and 2001/2002, the net profits in the fisheries had increased
from the early 1990s to 2014 (Statistics Iceland 2016,
Directorate of Fisheries 2015). In other terms: While less fish
was caught, the profits increased, albeit not in every
community.
Regarding demographics, the number of communities in
the stable segment decreased, while the number of vulnerable
communities increased by one third (see Fig. 3). Just one town
made it over to the stable category over time while seven fell
from that category to the vulnerable one. For both fisheries
and demographics, the way down – from a well-performing to
a vulnerable community – is a more likely development path
than the other way round. Some kind of an upward-moving
barrier was thus detected.
While the development in fisheries and demographics is
quite alarming, the overall socio-economic performance looks
slightly better, even though some 17 communities were still
classified as vulnerable in 2014. One reason for the compara-
ble better development could be municipality reforms includ-
ing amalgamations of towns, particularly after 2005; some
economic burden was thus taken away from heavily indebted
localities (Eythórsson et al., 2014, Kokorsch 2017).
The map (Fig. 4) shows the spatial distribution of the clus-
ter analysis for 2013/14 regarding the performance in fisher-
ies. Considering the population size and location, some strik-
ing observations can be made. None of the communities in the
Fig. 3 Distribution of villages in the vulnerable and stable clusters.
Absolute numbers of communities in the fishing year 1991/92 (left) and
2013/14 (right). The movement of communities between the clusters is
indicated with arrows. The dashed arrows show the number of villages
that did not match the definition of a ‘fishing village’ in 2014
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Westfjords, Northwest and Northeast ends up in the stable
category. Three out of four communities in the Westfjords
are in the vulnerable cluster and the situation in the
Northeast (seven out of twelve) is not much better. On the
other hand, the majority of communities in the positive cate-
gory can be found in the South/Southwest, including the cap-
ital, Reykjavík.
Dependence on a single company or quota holder and an
undiversified fleet leaves some seemingly well performing
communities ending up in the vulnerable category. The sheer
number of boats and quantity of landed fish is not an identifier
of a resilient fishing community. Examples have indeed
shown that the sudden loss of a trawler or processing facility
can have tremendous effects, not only for the fishing industry
but the entire community (Kokorsch 2017, Eythórsson 1996).
Remoteness, here measured in road distance to the capital,
is not an explanation for this development. Some remote com-
munities have been performing well due to the vicinity to
fishing grounds and strategic decisions by the quota-holding
companies: most of the bigger vertically integrated companies
have been running processing plants in different regions of the
country. However, recent examples have shown that local de-
cision makers and fish workers cannot count on a footloose
fishing industry. Several communities face difficulties regard-
ing their economic foundation and employment opportunities
due to decisions made by quota holders, that value the advan-
tages of centralisation in the southwestern corner of Iceland
higher than running a fish factory in remote localities.
Figure 5 shows the results of the demographic performance
in 2014. While some results were as expected, particularly in
the Southwest, others might be surprising at first sight, but
again it is more than the sheer number of people that counts:
gender balance and average age have also been included in the
assessment.
The East is a very problematic region, with some eight
communities being severely threatened in demographic terms.
In general, remoteness is a significant variable for the demo-
graphic development (see correlations below).
In Fig. 6 the socio-economic performance of each village is
presented. The picture is very mixed. A firm pattern is not
observable, neither in terms of regions nor according to com-
munity size.
Correlation analysis
The correlations of the three main fields reveal some trends.
Figure 7 shows the correlations between the three dimensions
at different points in time.While positive correlations between
all three main fields were found in 1992 and 2002, only one –
between fisheries and socio-economics – remained in 2014.
Table 2 shows the strongest correlations between the three
main fields and single variables in other fields over the years.
Some negative correlations can be identified, but the one be-
tween fisheries and community debts in 1992 and 2002 is
particularly noteworthy: has the aforementioned ‘consolida-
tion phase’ in terms of quotas lead to some indebted commu-
nities? Indeed, some municipalities took on a heavy financial
burden to keep quotas and processing locally (Eythórsson
1996, Willson and Gunnlaugsdóttir 2015, cf. Maguire 2015,
cf. Pinkerton 2015).
Quotas (still) matter for local economies: the more fishing
quota per capita, the stronger the socio-economic performance
Fig. 4 Spatial distribution of
clusters in the fisheries
dimension, 2014
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of the community. They also correlated positively with demo-
graphics in 2002 and 2014. In addition, the overall socio-
economic performance correlated with the total catch per
capita in all 3 years. Apart from quotas, the quantity and the
value of landings per capita also correlate with socio-
economics in 2002 and 2014. Furthermore, the number of
processing companies in the community correlated with the
overall socio-economics in 2014 and with the demographic
performance in 2014.
Indirectly connected with quotas is the question of scale,
here indicated by the relative importance of the small- and
large-scale fleets. The large-scale sector shows strong correla-
tions with some economic variables, such as municipality tax-
es and general income levels in 2002 and 2014. This is par-
ticularly interesting when the size of community is consid-
ered: while four communities with less than 300 inhabitants
had a trawler in their fleet in 2002, none did in 2014. Apart
from that, it can be stated for all 3 years that the stronger the
Fig. 5 Spatial distribution of
clusters in the demographic
dimension, 2014
Fig. 6 Spatial distribution of
clusters in the socio-economic
dimension, 2014
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fisheries sector was in a community, the higher were the av-
erage salaries.
The aforementioned observations regarding community
size and distance were also reflected in the correlation analy-
sis. While the road distance to the capital correlates with de-
mographics only (ρ = 0.458**), community size correlates
with all three fields in 2014. The strongest correlation can be
found with fisheries (ρ = 0.592**), followed by socio-
economics (ρ = 0.500**) and demographics (ρ = 0.406**).
Discussion and conclusion
Changes in communities and settlement patterns are inevita-
ble. They can disrupt the existing order, at best leading to a
‘creative destruction’ (Kivimaa and Kern 2016, Chaffin and
Gunderson 2016, Fainstein 2015). Changes become worri-
some when they occur too rapidly for the community to adjust
to them, particularly when they hit already vulnerable sys-
tems. They become a political and social issue when they
are foreseeable and avoidable.
Icelandic fishing communities have gone through substan-
tial demographic and socio-economic changes, not least dur-
ing the period that has been examined in this analysis. The loss
of a main industry, such as fisheries, is a change that has far-
reaching consequences for undiversified local economies.
While the ending of open access halted overfishing,
fisheries-dependent localities had to face immediate chal-
lenges regarding their future viability. Not all communities
have been able to adjust to the new circumstances, either be-
cause of economic constraints or the shortage of entrepreneur-
ial people with fresh ideas. Small and remote settlements have
been particularly strongly affected. Most ‘one company’ vil-
lages were trapped between two hard choices: either to use
municipal funds to invest in quotas, with the threat of being
saddled with debt, or risk the selling out of quotas and remain-
ing in comparatively stable economic waters.
To what extent demographic and socio-economic changes
since 1991/92 have paralleled the development in the fisheries
sector was one of the main questions in this paper. To start
with, the general importance of fisheries for the majority of
villages and towns has been decreasing. Yet there are still
numerous individual communities where a negative develop-
ment of the local fishing industry is mirrored by adverse de-
mographic and socio-economic trajectories. This counts par-
ticularly for small communities that are distant from
Reykjavík. Remoteness and size are two barriers that cannot
be overcome easily.
Barriers can also be detected on another level: Carothers
and Chambers (2012, 49) state that “the changing nature of
fishing relationships in many ITQ fisheries has substantially
decreased upward labour mobility, often creating impassable
class divisions”. Labour mobility is one issue that can be
linked to the problem of finding new entrants to the industry.
The quota issue is still pointed out by stakeholders in fisheries
as the main reason for the lack of recruitment (Kokorsch et al.,
2015). It is difficult for potential newcomers to establish a
business, and high quota leasing prices are a hindrance
(Chambers and Carothers 2017). One cannot judge howmany
people would potentially like to work in this industry these
Table 2 Correlations of three main dimensions with individual
variables
Dimension Correlations with Pearson’s r
1992 2002 2014
Fisheries (F) Debts (S) −.458** −.422**
Income (S) .569**
Municipality tax (S) .445** .505** .432**
Profits (S) .436**
Property value (S) .588** .511**
Salaries (S) .611** .418** .422**
Socio-economics
(S)
Landed value (F) .457** .498**
Landed quantity (F) .530
Processing plants (F) .343*
Processed value (F) .448** .339**
Quota (F) .582**
Share CFE (F) .449**
Total Catch (F) .416** .373** .362*
Demographics (D) Debts (S) −.415**
Fleet diversity (F) .358**
Income (S) .569**
Municipality tax (S) .565**
Processing plants (F) .383** .473**
Processed value (F) .339*
Property value (S) .452** .481**
Quota (F) .295* .298*
Salaries (S) .543** .560**
Significance of r: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01
Fig. 7 Correlations between the three dimensions in different time
periods
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days, however. Nonetheless, correlations were found between
demographics and the overall fisheries in 1992, which is not
surprising considering the rather undiversified economic
structure of rural Iceland at this point in time. Employment
opportunities and educational possibilities have changed con-
siderably since then.
Demographic challenges and changes cannot be explained
solely by quota loss. The question of keeping processing com-
panies and landings in a community or not is at least of equal
importance. Indirectly this is very much affected by quotas,
due to the vertical integration of companies (Benediktsson and
Karlsdóttir 2011, Carothers and Chambers 2012, Eythórsson
2000). Communities that experienced quota loss through sales
to companies from outside the community are disenfranchised
and dependent on the new quota holders. It is no longer up to
those communities whether or not their harbour and existing
processing facilities are used for processing and landing. That
only a few companies can decide where to land and process
fish is an alarming development that should raise concern
among policy makers and regional developers. Recent exam-
ples have confronted local and national policy makers with
this inconvenient fact (RUV 2014, Stundin 2017,
Hólmkelsdóttir and Hilmarsdóttir 2017).
The success of community quotas as a long-term support
scheme for suffering communities can be questioned. The
numbers here do not warrant a positive evaluation, especially
with respect to the increase of communities in the vulnerable
fisheries segment since 2002. With 27 communities in this
state, it is questionable whether a small amount of quota can
make much of a difference. That almost all of the fishing com-
munities listed here receive quotas from that scheme suggests
that these quotas are not only too thinly spread, but also end up
in communities where the need is not that great; several com-
munities that host large fishing companies are included. Some
community quotas even end up on large factory trawlers. This
is somewhat odd and contradictory, as the schemewasmeant to
support suffering communities. If such an instrument is expect-
ed to be successful, it should run on a long-term basis, with a
few dedicated communities which can build on a reliable
amount and at best enable new entrants to the industry. This
seems difficult, as any increase in the community quota alloca-
tion meets with disapproval from the large-scale industry and
their political allies. Besides, all communities will demand
quotas from such a scheme, which makes clear and unambig-
uous criteria for the allocation of community quotas necessary.
Dependency in terms of employment should be one crite-
rion for such a transitional community quota scheme, which is
meant to aid communities undergoing rapid change. The num-
ber of fisheries-related jobs on shore has been decreasing
steadily. Tailoring regional and community development to a
future without fisheries in the primary and secondary sector
thus seems more advisable. But as long as humans are part of
the fishing industry, and processing and landings are essential
for local economies, they need strong consideration in a truly
sustainable fisheries management.
Fisheries-related jobs, particularly in processing, have lost
attractiveness for young adolescents, many of whom intend to
leave smaller settlements (Bjarnason 2014a, Bjarnason and
Thorlindsson 2006, Þorgrímsdóttir et al., 2015). Mobility
and highly individualised life scripts are common, not only
in Iceland. A downward spiral caused by the loss of young-
sters can be set in motion, which in return can negatively
affect the social fabric and social cohesion of a community
(Dale and Newman 2006, Duhaime et al. 2004, Ozkan and
Schott 2013, Chan et al., 2006, Adger 2000). For Hovgaard
et al. (2004), one of the reasons for extended outmigration in
Nordic villages is changing social values. For Iceland this is of
relevance, since most fishing villages have been characterised
by kinship and a close-knit society (Skaptadóttir 2003, 1996).
The demographic situation in some communities would look a
lot worse without the influx of a migrant workforce that works
in processing sites (Skaptadóttir, 1996, 2003, 2004,
Skaptadóttir and Wojtynska 2008, Júlíusdóttir et al., 2013).
Some communities have lost almost half their population
since the early 1990s, resulting in a generation gap: the num-
ber of 20–39 year olds has decreased by up to 40%
(Þorgrímsdóttir et al., 2015). One of the key findings here is
that in the small places, whose livelihood depends on fisher-
ies, the loss of both people and fish is felt more acutely. The
number of vulnerable demographic communities has in-
creased over time. Communities with fewer than 1000 inhab-
itants face major demographic challenges and those with less
than 300 are severely threatened.
Whether or not regional policies and changes to the fisher-
ies management are successful, some communities will most
likely lose out as the inhabitants continue ‘voting with their
feet’ . Some might face abandonment eventually.
Depopulation, occasionally resulting in abandoned places,
has not been uncommon in Iceland (Bjarnason 2014b,
Thorarinsson 1961, Huijbens 2012, Valsson et al., 2013). To
what extent fisheries management can be made responsible
for demographic development cannot be answered; yet it has
been discussed frequently (Carothers and Chambers 2012).
One could also consider the abandonment of places as part
of a broader evolutionary trend, with small settlements being a
‘collateral damage’ of urbanisation.
Whether or not demographic difficulties were triggered by
the fisheries management, the era of ‘one-company villages’ is
arguably over. However, the diversification of local econo-
mies and their labour markets can hardly take place without
innovative capacity and economic capital. Communities with
quota holders and a solid fishing industry thus have a consid-
erable advantage. Previous work has discussed the signifi-
cance of different boat and quota classes extensively
(Chambers and Carothers 2017, Mariat-Roy 2014). The re-
sults here show that the presence of the large-scale sector,
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and particularly a trawler, makes a substantial difference for
local economies.
As resilience analysis should always come up with some
dynamic and prescriptive solution (Holling 2001), a first step
to make up for the adverse effects of privatised profits and
socialised follow-up costs could be a redistribution of the gen-
erated wealth (Olson 2011, Pinkerton and Edwards 2009). This
will not be easy under fully privatised fisheries, yet not impos-
sible. It seems odd at least that the state does not take more note
of its own clear assertion of the importance of the social aspect
of fisheries management, found in Article 1 of the Fisheries
Management Act that was quoted at the beginning of this paper.
Transferable quotas are entitlements that deliberately en-
abled and created a footloose industry – but one that certainly
leaves a ‘footprint’ wherever it has tread. Stable employment
and settlement, which are presented as sort of ultimate aim in
the Fisheries Management Act, can barely be reached with a
fully market based solution. Ostensibly designed to avoid an
Icelandic version of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Árnason
2012, Benediktsson 2014, Carothers and Chambers 2012), the
ITQ regime has generated the prosperity of a few and largely
ignored social aspects. To compensate for the social costs and
adverse effects, redistribution of revenues, for example
through a solidarity fund, seems to be more plausible than
waiting for the realisation of the mirage of trickle-down ef-
fects. Such a redistribution could be used to spur innovative
regional development and improve the conditions for realising
the aspiration of stability. Almost three decades after ‘quota
kings’ (Pálsson & Helgason, 1996) started to reign and econ-
omists claimed that ‘new wealth’ had somehow been created
(Árnason 2008) flexible tailor-made solutions, based on gen-
eral rules, fair principles and the ideal of social justice – for
both fisheries and regional development – would be more
appropriate for a truly sustainable and comprehensive fisher-
ies management than dogmatic market-based solutions.
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